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I. Introduction 
In December 2015, the Republican Party of Virginia proposed, 
and the Virginia State Board of Elections approved, a “statement 
of affiliation”1 for voters to sign in order to cast their ballots for the 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Virginia State Board of Elections GOP Statement of Affiliation, 
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Republican Party in the Commonwealth’s primary election on 
March 1, 2016.2 The Commonwealth of Virginia is an open-
primary state, which means it does not require its voters to register 
by party in order to vote in a party’s primary election.3 State law 
also allows “a political party to request that voters sign a pledge or 
statement of party affiliation before casting primary ballots.”4 
John Findlay, Executive Director of the Republican Party of 
Virginia, characterized his party’s statement of affiliation—“My 
signature below indicates that I am a Republican”—as a “very 
simple nine word statement.”5 But its purpose was undisputed: if 
a voter did not sign the statement, the voter would not be 
permitted to vote.6  
Republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump (Trump) 
opposed the statement of affiliation, arguing that it would alienate 
and discourage the participation of voters previously unaffiliated 
                                                                                                     
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. (Dec. 17, 2015) [hereinafter REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA.], 
http://virginia.gop/vagop-statement-of-affiliation/ “The Republican Party of 
Virginia’s State Central Committee (SCC) has set a reasonable threshold to 
participate in the 2016 Republican Presidential Primary, signing your name to a 
very simple nine word statement that reads: ‘My signature below indicates that I 
am a Republican.’”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 2. See Alana Austin, Oath Required to Vote in Va. Republican Presidential 
Primary, NBC29 (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.nbc29.com/story/30770194/oath-req 
uired-to-vote-in-va-republican-presidential-primary (“In the commonwealth 
voters do not register by a political party, but in order to take part in the March 
1 Republican presidential primary voters will have to sign an oath saying they 
are a Republican before casting a ballot.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 3. See Bill Bartel & Patrick Wilson, Virginia Voters Must Sign Statement 
Saying They’re Republican, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Dec. 16, 2015), https://pilot 
online.com/news/government/politics/virginia/virginia-voters-in-gop-primary-
must-sign-statement-saying-they/article_4bea8ea7-1e97-56a8-b48f-db62c80300  
f0.html (“Virginia voters do not register by party, and voting in primaries is open 
to anyone. However, state law allows a political party to request that voters sign 
a pledge or statement of party affiliation before casting primary ballots.”) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 4. Id.  
 5. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA., supra note 1. 
 6. See Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 486 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“Virginia 
Commissioner of Elections Edgardo Cortés testified in this Court that agency 
personnel added a notice that ‘[a]ny voter refusing to sign the statement form 
cannot vote in this Republican Party nominating process’ in order to keep the 
form consistent with earlier forms created by the SBE.”). 
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with the Republican Party—voters he presumed would cast their 
ballots for his campaign.7 Three Trump supporters filed a lawsuit 
in the Eastern District of Virginia in January 2016,8 claiming 
violations of their constitutional rights.9 In that case, Parson v. 
Alcorn,10 the federal court denied the plaintiffs’ motion seeking to 
enjoin the Republican Party’s use of the statement of affiliation.11 
But the Republican Party of Virginia unilaterally removed the 
statement of affiliation from the ballot before the primary 
election.12 Although no longer on the primary ballot, the 
                                                                                                     
 7. See Jenna Portnoy, Trump’s Objections to Va. Voter Pledge are Stirring 
Division in State GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.washington 
post.com/local/virginia-politics/trump-objections-to-va-voter-pledge-is-stirring-
divisions-in-state-gop/2015/12/30/180c9ade-af08-11e5-b820-eea4d64be2a1_story. 
html?utm_term=.4e173652eed5 (“All was relatively quiet until Sunday when 
Trump launched a five-tweet screed against the Virginia party, saying it ‘is 
working hard to disallow independent, unaffiliated and new voters.’ He called the 
pledge a ‘suicidal move’ and referred to Republican losses in elections for 
statewide offices in Virginia.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 8. See Antonio Olivo, Federal Judge Rules in Favor of Republican Loyalty 
Pledge in Virginia, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/virginia-politics/federal-judge-rules-in-favor-of-republican-loyalty-oath-in-
virginia/2016/01/14/b3a1e1f6-badf-11e5-b682-4bb4dd403c7d_story.html (“The 
lawsuit, filed this month in the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of three 
pastors who support Trump, stems from the state Republican Party’s decision in 
September to require voters to sign a ‘statement of intent’ before taking part in 
the primary.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 9. See generally Complaint at 12, Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp.3d 479 
(E.D. Va. 2016) (No. 3:16cv013) (praying for relief “declare the loyalty oath 
violates the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution as well as 
section 2 of the voting rights act and state law”). 
 10. See Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 501 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding 
that Virginia’s law allowing a political party to require a pledge in a presidential 
primary does not impose “‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of 
voters”) (citations omitted). 
 11. See Olivo, supra note 8 (“The testimony ‘does not support the 
extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction’ against including the 
requirement on instructions for ballots issued on election day or absentee ballots 
mailed to registered voters outside the state, [U.S. District Judge M. Hannah] 
Lauck ruled.”); see also Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 501 (denying the plaintiffs’ 
motion for preliminary injunction). 
 12. See Antonio Olivo & Laura Vozzella, Virginia GOP Drops Plan for 
Loyalty Pledge, But Maybe Too Late for Some Voters, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-gop-drops-plan-
for-loyalty-pledge-but-maybe-too-late-for-primary/2016/01/30/2c65d7a8-c799-
11e5-a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story.html?utm_term=.83271c943c3a (detailing that 
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Republican Party’s proposed pledge of loyalty revived old and 
sparked new questions about the existence, protection, and 
burdens of parties’ and voters’ associational rights in open primary 
elections, particularly when these constitutional rights seem to 
conflict. 
United States constitutional jurisprudence affirms the 
freedom of association for political parties and voters while also 
prescribing its limits.13 But there remain unanswered questions 
regarding the constitutional protections of and burdens on 
associational rights of parties and voters in an open primary. At 
the center of this conflict is one mechanism by which political 
parties attempt to preserve the freedom of association while still 
procuring the benefits of the open primary: party loyalty pledges 
on open primary election ballots.  
A party loyalty pledge in an open-primary system either 
protects a party’s freedom of association in an overly 
accommodating primary system, or it violates unaffiliated voters’ 
freedom of association in a primary system that maximizes their 
freedom to associate through their vote. Although some federal 
courts have concluded that a party loyalty pledge in an open 
primary is a constitutional means to protect a party’s associational 
rights,14 this Note disagrees with this legal conclusion and 
jurisprudential trend. This Note instead concludes that a state 
violates independent voters’ freedom of association when it permits 
or prescribes political parties to limit voter participation through 
party loyalty pledges in open primaries. 
Part I provides a background on the types of primary elections 
in the United States—specifically open primaries—and illustrates 
the historic and modern use of party loyalty pledges in open 
primary elections, focusing on the Republican Party of Virginia’s 
attempted use of its party loyalty pledge in the 2016 
                                                                                                     
the Republican Party of Virginia “scrapped plans to use a party loyalty pledge in 
the March 1 GOP presidential primary” on January 30, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 13. See Right of Association, JUSTIA US L., https://law.justia.com/constit 
ution/us/amendment-01/10-right-of-association.html#fn-642 (last visited April 
17, 2018) (“The right to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an 
integral part of this basic constitutional freedom . . . . Of course, the right is not 
absolute.”). 
 14. See generally Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 479. 
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Commonwealth Primary Election. Part II overviews election law 
and the First Amendment, explaining the unique nature of 
political parties, the limitations and expansions of parties’ 
associational rights, and the framework by which the Supreme 
Court attempts to resolve conflicts between parties and voters’ 
associational rights. Part III argues that the Anderson/Burdick 
balancing test—the Supreme Court’s foundational framework 
used to resolve constitutional controversies involving election 
law—was applied incorrectly in Parson, and it recommends a new 
approach to applying the test to strike down party loyalty pledges 
in open primaries as unconstitutional. This Note concludes that 
party loyalty pledges in open primaries constitute state action that 
impermissibly burdens the freedom of association of a protected 
class of independent voters and are a means not narrowly tailored 
to further any of a state’s compelling interests. 
II. Background 
A. General Primer on Primaries 
The United States Constitution assigns to state legislatures 
the responsibility of determining the “times, places and manner of 
holding elections” for federal offices.15 Each state legislature has 
the duty to administer its state’s primary elections, including 
determining “when primary elections will be held, whose name can 
go on a primary ballot . . . and who is allowed to vote in a 
primary.”16 Although there are several means by which a state 
legislature can permit parties to nominate candidates for general 
elections Congress and the presidency,17 all states except for 
California, Louisiana, and Washington conduct partisan party 
                                                                                                     
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 16. Kristin Kanthak & Eric Loepp, Political Parties and Primaries: The 
Tension Between Free Association and the Right to Vote, in LAW AND ELECTION 
POLITICS: THE RULES OF THE GAME 192 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2013). 
 17. See Jamie Gregorian, How Primary Election Laws Adversely Affect the 
Associational Rights of Political Parties in the Commonwealth of Virginia and 
How to Fix Them, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 135, 142 (2007) (explaining 
that while “primaries and conventions are the best-known methods of 
nomination, there are other means of nominating candidates,” including firehouse 
primaries, caucuses, and drawing candidates’ names from a hat).  
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primary elections.18 Each state has two types of party primary 
elections: congressional primaries and presidential primaries. For 
the sake of simplicity, this Note will refer to these collectively as 
“primary elections” or “primaries.” 
There are five general types of primary elections: “open, 
closed, semi-open, semi-closed, and non-partisan.”19 If a primary is 
closed, voters that are members of a party may only vote for 
candidates of the party of which they are members; if voters are 
not registered with a party, they cannot participate in that party’s 
primary election.20 A semi-closed primary, like a closed primary, 
does not allow for voters registered with one party to vote in 
another party’s primary.21 However, a semi-closed primary 
generally allows for individuals who are unregistered voters or 
registered independents to vote in the primary of the party of their 
choice.22 A nonpartisan primary features candidates that do not 
run on party affiliation; instead “the top two voter-getters, 
regardless of party, face each other in the general election.”23 Only 
California, Louisiana, and Washington administer nonpartisan 
primary elections, and only Louisiana’s election process does not 
feature a general election if one candidate receives a majority of 
the primary election vote.24 
                                                                                                     
 18. Kanthak & Loepp, supra note 16, at 192. 
 19. Id. at 192. 
 20. See id. at 195 (explaining that in “a closed primary state, a registered 
Democrat could not decide to vote in the Republican primary on Election Day. 
Instead, voters must change their party affiliation long before the day they wish 
to cast their ballots”). 
 21. See id. (“Other states have semi-closed primary systems in which some, 
but not all, voters can vote on Election Day. In those states, people who are 
registered as members of one party may not vote in the primary of any other 
party.”). 
 22. See id. (“Depending on the state, voters who are independents may 
participate in any one primary, or voters who are unregistered may register and 
vote in any one primary. After that . . . the voter is registered as a member of the 
party associated with the primary in which he or she voted.”). 
 23. Id. at 194. 
 24. See id. at 194–95 (“Note that the top-two primary used in California and 
Washington differs from the Louisiana nonpartisan primary because the top two 
vote-getters in California and Washington always go to a general election, 
regardless of whether one candidate receives a majority of the vote.”). 
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B. The Nature, Use, Benefits, and Risks of Open Primaries 
The pure open, and the semi-open, primary are the two types 
of the open primary, which does not require voters to be members 
of the parties for which they vote.25 A pure open primary permits 
voters to participate without disclosing their party affiliation until 
they have cast their ballot; a semi-open primary requires voters to 
declare their party affiliation when they request a ballot.26 Overall, 
an open primary’s defining feature is that “voters do not have to 
declare their party affiliation until Election Day,”27 either by 
requesting a party’s ballot or by casting a party’s ballot.  
Twenty-six states hold variations of open primaries for one or 
both of the two major political parties in presidential primaries; 
thirty states have variations of open primaries for one or both of 
the two major political parties in congressional primaries.28 Of 
these, fifteen states conduct pure open primaries for one or both 
major parties.29  
Open primaries often present benefits to candidates. Because 
open primaries expand the pool of potential voters beyond 
registered party members, candidates at odds with blocs of voters 
in their parties or incumbents that do not wish to be held 
accountable by their parties in upcoming elections often favor open 
primaries.30 For example, in 2016, Republican candidate for 
                                                                                                     
 25. See id. at 192 (“Primaries vary on how open or closed they are to voter 
participation. Also, some states have different rules for each party. There are five 
primary types: open, closed, semi-open, semi-closed, and nonpartisan.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 26. See id. at 193 (“There are two types of open primaries. In a pure open 
primary, voters may vote in secret, so that not even poll workers know in which 
primary they participated. In a semi-open primary, voters must declare their 
party affiliation at the time they vote.”). 
 27. Id.  
 28. State Primary Election Types, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (July 21, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Patrick M. McSweeney, Open Primaries Hurt the Parties, DAILY 
PRESS (June 24, 2001), http://articles.dailypress.com/2001-06-24/news/010621 
0533_1_primary-democratic-party-democratic-candidate (“Strange as it may 
seem, the politicians who make the laws favor this open system because it greatly 
reduces their accountability to the political party that originally nominated 
them.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
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president Trump performed substantially better in open-primary 
states than he did in closed-primary states.31 Political 
commentators speculated that Trump’s success in open primaries 
was likely the result of votes from independent voters, registered 
Democrats, and new voters—all made possible or more convenient 
because of the use of open primaries.32 
But open primaries pose risks to parties. Like the Republican 
Party of Virginia acknowledged when it introduced its statement 
of affiliation for the 2016 primary election, political parties in open-
primary states are at risk of unaffiliated voters affecting—if not 
determining—the outcomes of their primary elections.33 This 
practice of “raiding” open primaries is not mere conjecture.34 
Examples of successful raids abound—particularly in Virginia, as 
Patrick M. McSweeney (McSweeney), former chairman of the 
Republican Party of Virginia, has identified.35 
McSweeney says that Henry Howell (Howell) defeated Andy 
Miller in the 1977 Democratic primary because “thousands of 
Republicans voted for Howell in the primary, believing that Howell 
would be the less imposing candidate in the general election 
contest against Republican John Dalton, the eventual winner.”36 
Similar interference occurred in the 1989 Republican primary: 
although three candidates collected more than 400,000 votes, the 
margin of victory was fewer than 7,000 votes and more than 30,000 
votes had been cast by registered Democrats.37 In the 1996 
                                                                                                     
 31. See Eric Chemi & Michael Fahey, Trump’s Big Advantage: Open 
Primaries, CNBC (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/22/trumps-big-
advantage-open-primaries.html (“Political commentators noticed something 
interesting early on about Donald Trump’s surprising sweep through the 
Republican primaries—the mogul seems to do better in states that let almost any 
voter help pick the party nominee, not just those registered to a party.”) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 32. See generally id. 
 33. See id. (explaining that the “‘open’ primary system has frequently 
provided an opportunity for members of one party to ‘raid’ the primary of an 
opposing party to assure the nomination of a candidate who would otherwise not 
have won”). 
 34. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572 (2000) (explaining 
that “raiding” is “a process in which dedicated members of one party formally 
switch to another party to alter the outcome of that party’s primary”). 
 35. McSweeney, supra note 30. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
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Republican primary, an estimated thousands of Democratic voters 
cast votes for Republican U.S. Senate candidate John Warner—
handing him the nomination—but then voted for his Democratic 
opponent, Mark Warner, in the general election.38 In 2000, 
Republican presidential candidate John McCain actively invited 
Democrats and independents to vote for him in Virginia’s 
Republican primary, which he won.39 
As long as open primaries exist, candidates will exercise such 
strategies to benefit from open primary elections and states will 
employ methods—such as party loyalty pledges—to mitigate the 
risks of open primary elections. 
C. The Historic and Modern Use of Party Loyalty Pledges in 
Primary Elections 
In open-primary systems, political parties often adopt 
measures to diminish the risk of raiding and internal division 
costing the party an ideal nominee and a general election victory.40 
Although their use is not widespread, party loyalty pledges can be 
a mechanism by which parties attempt to limit open primary 
participation to its members or unregistered voters who are willing 
to publicly affiliate with the party. They currently exist in five 
states that statutorily mandate open primary elections: Alabama, 
Arkansas, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia (see Table below). 
                                                                                                     
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. See Alex Isenstadt, GOP Circulates Loyalty Pledge to Box Trump In, 
POLITICO (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/republican-nati 
onal-committee-2016-campaign-pledge-213283 (explaining that in the case of the 
2016 presidential election, Trump possessed the influence and affluence to mount 
an independent bid that “could be enough to sink the eventual Republican 
nominee,” and that this was a consideration of the Republican National 
Committee in circulating the pledge to all candidates) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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Table: States Permitting or Requiring Party Loyalty Pledges 
in Open Primary Elections 
State Text of Statute 
Alabama 
“At the option of a political party at the bottom of the 
ballot and after the name of the last candidate shall be 
printed the following: ‘By casting this ballot I do 
pledge myself to abide by the result of this primary 
election and to aid and support all the nominees 
thereof in the ensuing general election.’ 
“Should any voter scratch out, deface, or in any way 
mutilate or change the pledge printed on the ballot, 
the voter shall not be considered or held to have 
repudiated or to have refused to take the pledge, but 
shall, conclusively, be presumed and held to have 
scratched out, defaced, or mutilated or changed the 
same for the sole purpose of identifying the ballot; and, 
accordingly, such ballot shall be marked ‘spoiled ballot’ 
and shall not be counted.”41 
Arkansas 
“Party in its discretion may elect to require loyalty 
pledge and its discretion may waive such requirement, 
subject only to timely challenge by candidate or person 
with such relationship with political party so as to 




“The managers at each box shall require every 
voter to take the following additional oath and 
pledge: ‘I do solemnly swear or affirm that I am 
duly qualified to vote at this primary election 
and that I have not voted before at this primary 
election or in any other party’s primary election 
or officially participated in the nominating 
convention for any vacancy for which this 
primary is being held.’”43 
                                                                                                     
 41. ALA. CODE § 17-13-8 (2018). 
 42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-301 (West 2017). 
 43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-1010 (2017). 
574 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.563 (2018) 
Texas 
“The following pledge shall be placed on the primary 
election ballot above the listing of candidates’ names: ‘I 
am a (insert appropriate political party) and 
understand that I am ineligible to vote or participate in 
another political party’s primary election or convention 
during this voting year.’”44 
Virginia 
“If the party has determined that it will hold a 
presidential primary, each registered voter of the 
Commonwealth shall be given an opportunity to 
participate in the presidential primary of the political 
party, as defined in § 24.2-101, subject to requirements 
determined by the political party for participation in its 
presidential primary. The requirements may include, 
but shall not be limited to, the signing of a pledge by 
the voter of his intention to support the party’s 
candidate when offering to vote in the primary. The 
requirements applicable to a party’s primary shall be 
determined at least 90 days prior to the primary date 
and certified to, and approved by, the State Board.”45 
 
Party loyalty pledges are not new. State courts have upheld 
challenges to the constitutionality of party loyalty pledges—and 
voter participation requirements akin to them—for over one 
hundred years.46 Of the five statutory schemes permitting the use 
                                                                                                     
 44. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 172.086 (West 2017). 
 45. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-545(A) (2017). 
 46. See Robin Miller, Constitutionality of Voter Participation Provisions for 
Primary Elections, 120 A.L.R. 5TH 125, at § 3 (2004) (listing past cases from 
various states where the court has upheld the party loyalty pledges as 
constitutional). Miller writes: 
The courts in the following cases held constitutional, under either the 
federal or the state constitution, a requirement that a voter, before 
voting in a party’s primary election, pledge loyalty to the party. 
U.S. 
Jones v. Alabama, 2001 WL 303533 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (Alabama law 
required primary voters to sign a poll list containing a pledge to 
support the party’s nominees) 
Ark. 
McClain v. Fish, 159 Ark. 199, 251 S.W. 686 (1923) (recognizing rule)  
Cal. 
Rebstock v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 146 
Cal. 308, 80 P. 65 (1905) (a voter at a political party’s primary election 
must declare a bona fide present intention of supporting the nominees 
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of pledges in open primaries that exist today, Alabama and 
Virginia’s provisions have been legally challenged; both have 
survived the constitutional scrutiny of federal courts.47  
                                                                                                     
of the party at the next ensuing election) 
La. 
State ex rel. Labauve v. Michel, 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430 (1908) (promise 
to support party’s nominee) 
N.D. 
State v. Flaherty, 23 N.D. 313, 136 N.W. 76 (1912) (recognizing rule)  
N.J. 
Hopper v. Stack, 69 N.J.L. 562, 56 A. 1 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1903) (if 
challenged, a voter is required to make an affidavit stating that, at the 
last general election at which he voted, he voted for a majority of the 
candidates of the party with which he is proposing to act)  
Neb. 
State v. Drexel, 74 Neb. 776, 105 N.W. 174 (1905) (no person shall “be 
entitled to vote at such primary election until he shall have first stated 
to the judges of said primary election what political party he affiliates 
with, and whose candidates he supported at the last election, and 
whose candidates he intends to support at the next election”) 
Nev. 
Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 P. 444 (1910) (voter must affirm 
voter’s “bona fide present intention to support the nominees of such 
political party or organization”) 
Or. 
Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Or. 167, 66 P. 714 (1901) (test is that the elector 
“voted for a majority of the candidates of such party or association at 
the last election, or intends to do so at the next election”)  
S.D. 
Morrow v. Wipf, 22 S.D. 146, 115 N.W. 1121 (1908) (primary law 
required primary voter, on being challenged, to swear that he is in good 
faith a member of the party, and that he intends to support the 
principles thereof and the candidates nominated at the primary) 
Wash. 
State v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 P. 728 (1908) (challenged primary 
election voter must make oath or affirmation that he intends to affiliate 
with the party whose ballot he demands at the ensuing election, and 
that he intends to support generally the candidates of that party). 
Id. 
 47. See Jones v. Alabama, No. 00-0442-RV-L, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3909, 
at *16 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2001) (finding the Alabama Democratic Party’s party 
loyalty pledge to be no more than a permissible minimal burden on the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters); see also Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 
3d 479, 497 (E.D. Va. 2016) (finding that the Virginia Republican Party’s 
“statement of affiliation” did not impose a severe burden on the rights of voters 
and advanced the party’s constitutional rights). 
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The Virginia Republican Party’s statement of affiliation was 
intended as a threshold requirement for voters to participate in the 
Virginia Republican presidential primary election.48 The notice to 
the voter on the Republican Party’s primary ballots explained: 
Section 24.2-545 of the Code of Virginia allows the political 
party holding a primary to determine requirements for voting 
in the primary. The [Republican Party of Virginia] has 
determined that the following statement shall be a requirement 
of your participation. Any voter refusing to sign the statement 
form cannot vote in this Republican Party nominating process.49 
Virginia Commissioner of Elections Edgardo Cortés confirmed the 
intent of the statement’s presence on the ballot: if a voter did not 
sign the statement, the voter would not be permitted to vote.50  
Supporters of the statement said the Republican Party 
designed the pledge to “prevent Democrats and wishy-washy 
Republicans from choosing the party’s nominee.”51 Opponents of 
the statement, including members of the Republican Party, said 
the party had “no place excluding voters from a taxpayer-funded 
process and should focus instead on broadening their base.”52 To 
assuage critics, John Findlay argued the statement of affiliation 
was not “an ‘oath’ or ‘pledge’ in any way” and “not targeting any 
candidate, group of voters or an unreasonable barrier to voting.”53 
Instead, Findlay said that the “purpose of the statement is to build 
our party and prevent Democrats from voting in the March 1st 
                                                                                                     
 48. Patrick Wilson & Bill Bartel, Virginia Voters in GOP Primary Must Sign 
Statement Saying They’re Republican, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Dec. 16, 2015), https:// 
pilotonline.com/news/government/politics/virginia/article_4bea8ea7-1e97-56a8 
-b48f-db62c80300f0.html (“GOP spokesman David D’Onofrio said that because 
Virginia doesn’t require party registration, ‘this is a very simple and low-
threshold statement to affirm that you mean to be voting in a Republican 
primary.’”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 49. See Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 487 (including the proposed form of the 
defendants). 
 50. See id. at 486 (“Virginia Commissioner of Elections Edgardo Cortés 
testified in this Court that agency personnel added a notice that ‘[a]ny voter 
refusing to sign the statement form cannot vote in this Republican Party 
nominating process’ in order to keep the form consistent with earlier forms 
created by the SBE.”). 
 51. Portnoy, supra note 7. 
 52. Id. 
 53. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA., supra note 1. 
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Republican presidential primary.”54 In addition to ensuring only 
self-identifying Republicans would participate in the party’s 
primary election, the party intended to construct a Republican 
voter list based on the names and contact information provided as 
affirmations of the statement of affiliation.55 As explained above, 
even though the Eastern District of Virginia found the statement 
of affiliation to be constitutionally permissible to survive an 
injunction, the Republican Party voluntarily rescinded it.  
III. Election Law and the Constitution 
The Supreme Court affirms that the “freedom of association 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments includes 
partisan political organization,”56 going so far as to say the 
question of a political party’s freedom of association is “well 
settled.”57 But is it well settled? This section explores current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on political parties’ freedom of 
association through a four-part framework: first, the 
characterization of the nature and functions of political parties and 
their freedom of association; second, the limitations the state 
action doctrine presents for political parties’ freedom of 
association; third, the evolution and expansion of political parties’ 
freedom of association in notable Supreme Court cases; and fourth, 
the historic resolution of the conflict between the associational 
rights of political parties and independent voters.58  
                                                                                                     
 54. Andrew Cain, Trump’s Va. Campaign Threatens Legal Action Against 
State GOP, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.richmond.com 
/news/virginia/government-politics/article_b289d3fe-e438-5941-85a1-1cd3c6 
138b43.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 55. See id. (“Findlay also asserted: ‘The fact is the Democrats are terrified 
that our new statement will give us an opportunity to develop a large statewide 
voter list for future party building.’”). 
 56. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) (holding 
that Connecticut’s closed primary statute interfered with a political party’s right 
to define its associational boundaries). 
 57. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989) 
(holding that a ban on primary endorsements by a political party violates the first 
and fourteenth amendments). 
 58. See Nathaniel Persily, Toward A Functional Defense of Political Party 
Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 764 (2001) (“In most cases dealing with the 
freedom of expressive association, the inquiry requires both characterizing the 
578 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.563 (2018) 
A. The Unique Nature of Political Parties 
Political parties are traditionally characterized as private 
organizations deserving of First Amendment protections against 
the State.59 Professor Daniel H. Lowenstein (Professor 
Lowenstein), an expert in election law, reasons that if a political 
party is a private organization, “it follows that a party and its 
members, like other private organizations and their members, 
enjoy the First Amendment right of freedom of association.”60 
Because “the First Amendment is centrally concerned with 
protection of political speech and association, the constitutional 
right of freedom of association enjoyed by a political party is 
especially strong in comparison with the rights of nonpolitical 
groups.”61 Since a political party’s freedom of association is 
grounded in a constitutional right “it follows that any substantial 
infringement of this freedom by government is unconstitutional 
unless the infringement is the least restrictive means by which a 
compelling state interest can be served.”62 
But political parties are also unlike nearly all other private 
organizations.63 Parties assume different forms dependent upon 
their different functions, and each form deserves a unique 
constitutional protection.64 A party’s form is determined by its 
                                                                                                     
organization that claims the right and explaining how the law will affect 
organizational membership so as to burden severely the organization’s 
expression.”). 
 59. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political 
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1745 (1993) (“The doctrinal 
argument against regulation of political parties is simply, and within the 
conventional First Amendment framework, nearly irresistible. Its starting point, 
and only sticking point, is the premise that a political party is a private 
organization.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1745–46. 
 62. Id. at 1746. 
 63. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (E.D. Cal. 
1997) (“[T]he analogy between the political parties and the myriad of private 
political, charitable, recreational, educational or religious associations at the 
center of American life, is imperfect at best.”). 
 64. See Lowenstein, supra note 59, at 1760 (“[T]he things parties do are done 
by different groups of people, varying enormously in number and in their relations 
with one another. In short, there is no simple way to describe what a party is, and 
the term ‘party’ can be and is used with greatly disparate referents.”). 
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function—whether it is public, private, or a combination of the 
two.65 A party’s function may be classified on a spectrum between 
how much a party—independent of the government—manages its 
affairs to influence the government, and how much a 
government—dependent on the authority of parties—implements 
and enforces laws to influence the parties.66  
Renowned political scientist and professor V.O. Key identifies 
three forms of the modern political party: “party-in-the-
electorate,”67 the “party-in-the-government,”68 and the 
professional political group.69 For example, a “reference to ‘the 
Republicans’ or ‘the Democrats’ may refer to loyalties, affiliations, 
or voting tendencies among the electorate; to partisan-based 
structures and activities of elected officials; or to hierarchical party 
administrative structures consisting of persons who are not elected 
officials.”70 Ultimately, the key distinction between political 
parties and all purely private associations is that “political parties 
routinely, pervasively, and legitimately exercise their influence 
from within the government.”71  
This inherent, important public function of political parties 
frustrates the application of conventional constitutional doctrinal 
                                                                                                     
 65. See generally id. at 1747–48 (discussing how past writers have classified 
a party or their activities as “public” or “private”). 
 66. See id. at 1756 (explaining that “it [is] reasonable to say that when the 
government ‘regulates’ the parties, to a very large extent the parties are 
regulating themselves,” and that it “may be argued that the parties are no 
different in this regard from other private sector groups or that if they are, the 
difference is merely one of degree”); see also id. at 1759–60 (describing that “a 
political party is not something occupies a particular space at a particular time or 
that can be discerned with the senses” and that “there is no simply way to describe 
what a party is, and the term ‘party’ can be and is used with greatly disparate 
referents”). 
 67. See V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 164 (1964) 
(“Within the body of voters as a whole, groups are formed of persons who regard 
themselves as party members . . . . Party in this sense of the ‘party-in-the-
electorate’ is an amorphous group, yet it has a social reality.”). 
 68. See id. (explaining that “[a]t times party denotes groups within the 
government,” namely government officials “which could be held accountable for 
the conduct of the government”). 
 69. See id. (referring to “the group of more or less professional political 
workers” who “do the work of the political organization” more or less “separate 
and apart from the party-in-the-electorate, but not necessarily independent of it”). 
 70. Lowenstein, supra note 59, at 1764. 
 71. Id. at 1758 (emphasis added). 
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analysis to First Amendment claims.72 Professor Lowenstein 
argues the public functions of parties render a conventional 
doctrinal framework “inadequate for properly analyzing the 
relationship between parties and the government.”73 He takes the 
view that political parties are state actors, not independent private 
organizations.74 In fact, he says, parties’ major interactions with 
the government “are not as objects of government actions. To the 
contrary, parties operate upon, and actually constitute, the 
government.”75 For example, any state statute is enacted by 
politicians “who have been elected to office as Republicans or 
Democrats, who in most instances have organized their legislative 
houses as Republicans and Democrats, and whose activities and 
decisions occur in a formal and informal structure fundamentally 
influenced by the fact that they are Republicans and Democrats.”76 
In sum, the unique purpose, functions, and activities of political 
parties make them unlike any other private organization 
possessing associational rights—their actions may be subject to 
constitutional scrutiny. 
B. Constitutional Limitations on the Associational Rights of 
Political Parties 
The foundation of understanding the constitutional rights and 
limitations of political parties is the unique nature and public 
function of political parties—and the conclusion that they are state 
actors. This subpart will introduce the state action doctrine—
through the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the White Primary 
Cases—and demonstrate how political parties’ administration of 
primary elections is state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
                                                                                                     
 72. See id. at 1758–59 (“Conventional constitutional doctrine, because of its 
preoccupation with the state’s output—its active operations on the private 
sector—has been unable to take into account the parties’ domination from within 
of the state and its policies, which is much the more important relationship 
between parties and the state.”). 
 73. Id. at 1756. 
 74. Id. at 1759. 
 75. Id. at 1756. 
 76. Id. 
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1. Introduction to State Action Doctrine: The White Primary Cases 
State action doctrine fundamentally limits a political party’s 
right to association.77 As a private organization, a political party 
will not invoke a court’s constitutional scrutiny of its methods of 
internal regulation unless its activities constitute state action.78 In 
general, state action will only be found when: “(1) the actor is an 
agent of the government;” (2) the actor performs a function 
“traditionally exclusively reserved to the State;” or (3) the 
government “jointly participates” with the private actor.”79 A brief 
survey of Supreme Court case law applying the state action 
doctrine to constitutional questions in primary election 
controversies demonstrates this. 
The White Primary Cases constitute the Supreme Court’s 
seminal jurisprudence on whether primary elections can be state 
action.80 In particular, the White Primary Cases demonstrate that 
primary elections or pre-election processes “may possess all three 
qualifications for state action and certainly would satisfy at least 
one of them.”81 Thus, the White Primary Cases provide helpful 
factors to consider when deciding whether a political party’s 
actions—including the enforcement of a party loyalty pledge—
within an open-primary system constitute state action and thus 
ought to be subject to constitutional review.82 A brief overview of 
the White Primary Cases is required to evaluate parties’ attempts 
to preserve and protect their freedom of association within open-
primary systems. 
                                                                                                     
 77. See generally Persily, supra note 58, at 754–55. 
 78. See generally id. 
 79. Id. at 759. 
 80. Kanthak & Loepp, supra note 16, at 192. 
 81. Persily, supra note 58, at 760. 
 82. See id. at 755 (“The White Primary Cases have provided a template for 
characterizing primary elections as state action and for setting constitutional 
limits on parties’ power to define the bounds of their membership.”). 
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a. Nixon v. Herndon: A State’s Administration of Primary 
Elections is State Action 
Nixon v. Herndon83 is the first of the White Primary Cases. 
The plaintiff, L.A. Nixon, was an African-American citizen of the 
United States and the state of Texas, and a resident of El Paso.84 
Although otherwise legally qualified to vote in the Democratic 
Primary election,85 a Texas statute—Article 3093a86—prohibited 
African-Americans from voting in the Texas Democratic Party 
primary elections.87 In 1927, the Supreme Court of the United 
States struck down Article 3093a under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, reasoning: “States may do a good deal of classifying 
that it is difficult to believe rational, but there are limits.”88 
Because the Texas Democratic Party’s unconstitutional exclusion 
of African-Americans was statutorily imposed, it was 
unquestionably state action: 
While that mandate was in force, the Negro was shut out 
from a share in primary elections, not in obedience to the 
will of the party speaking through the party organs, but 
by the command of the State itself, speaking by the voice 
of its chosen representatives. At the suit of this petitioner, 
the statute was adjudged void as an infringement of his 
rights and liberties under the Constitution of the United 
States.89 
Herndon stands for the principle that when literal state action 
regulating primary elections violates the constitutional rights of 
individual voters, the government’s action will be subject to 
                                                                                                     
 83. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (holding that Texas’ 
white primary statute violated the fourteenth amendment because the statute 
discriminated against African Americans because of color alone). 
 84. Id. at 539. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) art. 3107, repealed by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., 
ch. 480 § 26(1) (1985). This law was designated as Article 3093a. See Herndon, 
273 U.S. at 540 (“[T]he denial was based upon a Statute of Texas enacted in May, 
1923, and designated Article 3093a.”). 
 87. See Herndon, 273 U.S. at 540 (describing Texas Article 3093a as 
legislating: “in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic 
party primary election held in the State of Texas”). 
 88. Id. at 541. 
 89. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81 (1932).  
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constitutional review. Government action of this type is the most 
express form of state action. 
b. Nixon v. Condon: A Political Party’s State-Delegated 
Administration of Primary Elections is State Action 
Nixon v. Condon,90 the second of the White Primary Cases, 
was decided six years after Herndon. In Condon, Nixon attempted 
to vote in another Texas Democratic Party primary election and 
was again denied a ballot.91 In response to the Court’s decision in 
Herndon, the Texas legislature repealed Article 3093a but replaced 
it with a new statute granting each political party’s State 
Executive Committee the authority and discretion to prescribe 
membership qualifications: 
[E]very political party in this State through its State 
Executive Committee shall have the power to prescribe 
the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own 
way determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise 
participate in such political party; provided that no person 
shall ever be denied the right to participate in a primary 
in this State because of former political views or 
affiliations or because of membership or non-membership 
in organizations other than the political party.92 
Granted this newfound statutory authority, the State Executive 
Committee of the Democratic Party “adopted a resolution ‘that all 
white democrats who are qualified under the constitution and laws 
of Texas . . . be allowed to participate in the primary elections.’”93 
Thus, when Nixon “presented himself at the polls and requested 
that he be furnished with a ballot” the judges of the election 
declined “on the ground that the petitioner was a Negro and that 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (holding that the decisions 
of a party’s state executive committee qualify as state action when the committee 
is exercising power granted to it by the state legislature).  
 91. See id. at 81 (“This is not the first time that [the petitioner] has found it 
necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in vindication of 
privileges secured to him by the Federal Constitution.”). 
 92. Id. at 82. 
 93. Id. 
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by force of the resolution of the Executive Committee only white 
Democrats were allowed to be voters at the Democratic primary.”94  
Unlike the State’s independent, express statutory exclusion of 
African-American voters in Herndon, the scheme under review in 
Condon was the Texas Democratic Party’s exclusion of 
African-American voters under the authority granted to it by the 
State.95 In reviewing the Texas Democratic Party’s resolution 
under state law, the Court distinguished Condon from Herndon by 
explaining that the test for finding state action “is not whether the 
members of the Executive Committee are the representatives of 
the State in the strict sense in which an agent is the representative 
of his principal.”96 Instead, the “test is whether they are to be 
classified as representatives of the State to such an extent and in 
such a sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set limits 
to their action.”97  
Applying this test, the Court determined that the decisions 
made by State Executive Committee, under the statutory 
authority granted by the State of Texas, qualified as state action.98 
The Court held: 
The pith of the matter is simply this, that when those agencies 
are invested with an authority independent of the will of the 
association in whose name they undertake to speak, they 
become to that extent the organs of the State itself, the 
repositories of official power. They are then the governmental 
instruments whereby parties are organized and regulated to the 
end that government itself may be established or continued. 
What they do in that relation, they must do in submission to the 
mandates of equality and liberty that bind officials 
everywhere.99 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 85 (“Power so intrenched is statutory, not inherent. If the State 
had not conferred it, there would be hardly color of right to give a basis for its 
exercise.”). 
 96. Id. at 89. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658 (1944) (explaining that the 
Condon Court “reversed the dismissal of the suit for the reason that the 
Committee action was deemed to be state action and invalid as discriminatory 
under the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 99. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932). 
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In short, the government cannot delegate the administration of 
state functions to a private organization and not be ultimately 
responsible for the organization’s actions if those actions violate 
constitutional law.100 The scheme struck down in Condon 
represents state action comprising a private actor acting on behalf 
of the government, and the government acting jointly with a 
private actor. 
c. Smith v. Allwright: A Political Party’s Administration of 
Primary Elections is State Action 
The Court’s reasoning and holding in Condon were affirmed in 
1944 in Smith v. Allwright,101 the third of the White Primary 
Cases. In contrast to the state-mandated racial discrimination in 
Herndon and state-permitted racial discrimination of Condon, 
Smith presented an altogether different question: whether a 
political party’s independent discriminatory membership 
requirements constituted state action.102  
In Allwright, the petitioner—an African-American citizen of 
the United States and the State of Texas—was refused a ballot and 
a vote in the 1940 Texas Democratic Party primary election.103 The 
state Democratic Party’s refusal was predicated on its 
resolution,104 adopted on May 24, 1932: “Be it resolved that all 
white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote under 
the Constitution and laws of the State shall be eligible to 
membership in the Democratic party and, as such, entitled to 
                                                                                                     
 100. See id. (“The pith of the matter is simply this, that when those agencies 
are invested with an authority independent of the will of the association in whose 
name they undertake to speak, they become to that extent the organs of the State 
itself, the repositories of official power.”). 
 101. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (holding that the Texas’ 
Democratic Party’s rule conferring membership, and therefore the right to vote in 
primary elections, on only white citizens was covered by the state action doctrine 
and therefore violated the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 102. See id. at 662 (“We are thus brought to an examination of the 
qualifications for Democratic primary electors in Texas, to determine whether 
state action or private action has excluded Negroes from participation.”). 
 103. See id. at 650–51 (describing the cause of action that led to the granting 
of certiorari). 
 104. See id. at 657 (“It was by virtue of this resolution that the respondents 
refused to permit the petitioner to vote.”). 
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participate in its deliberations.”105 The Democratic Party of Texas 
defended its resolution on the ground that it was a “voluntary 
organization with members banded together for the purpose of 
selecting individuals of the group representing the common 
political beliefs as candidates in the general election.”106 Arguing 
it was an independent, voluntary political organization, the party 
claimed it was “free to select its own membership and limit to 
whites participation in the party primary” since primaries are 
“political party affairs, handled by party, not governmental, 
officers.”107 Furthermore, the party claimed, the Fourteenth, 
Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments were “applicable only to 
general elections where governmental officers are actually 
elected,” not to primary elections since “officers of government 
cannot be chosen at primaries.”108 
In response, the Court affirmed that a political party generally 
possesses the right to determine membership requirements as a 
necessary element of the freedom of association.109 The State has 
the right to “conduct her elections and limit her electorate as she 
may deem wise” within the constraints imposed by the 
Constitution.110 But the Court reasoned that when party 
membership is a requirement to vote in a primary election, and 
when “primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing 
officials, state and national, as they have here, the same tests to 
determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should 
be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election.”111  
This landmark characterization of primary elections extended 
the Court’s conclusion in United States v. Classic:112 Section IV of 
                                                                                                     
 105. Id. at 656–57. 
 106. Id. at 657. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 664 (“The privilege of membership in a party may be . . . no 
concern of a State.”). 
 110. See id. (“Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit her electorate as 
she may deem wise, save only as her action may be affected by the prohibitions of 
the United States Constitution or in conflict with powers delegated to and 
exercised by the National Government.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (holding that “a 
primary election . . . is an election within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision and is subject to congressional regulation as to the manner of holding 
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Article I of the Constitution “authorized Congress to regulate 
primary as well as general elections ‘where the primary is by law 
made an integral part of the election machinery.’”113 Because 
primary elections and general elections were considered state 
functions requiring constitutional protections, the Court affirmed 
the fundamental right to vote in primary elections: “It may now be 
taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a primary for the 
nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like 
the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by the 
Constitution.”114 
Allwright represents the instances when state action takes the 
form of a private actor performing a function traditionally 
exclusively reserved to the State.115 Because the Court construed 
primary elections as state functions requiring constitutional 
scrutiny, a political party’s operation of the State’s primary 
election could be characterized as state action.116 In other words, 
while “no state law directed such exclusion,” the Court “pointed out 
that many party activities were subject to considerable statutory 
control.”117 
d. Terry v. Adams: A Private Organization’s Administration of 
Primary Elections is State Action 
Terry v. Adams118 is the fourth and final of the White Primary 
Cases. The Jaybird Association—a private political organization—
                                                                                                     
it”). 
 113. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 659–60 (1944) (quoting Classic, 313 
U.S. at 318). 
 114. Id. at 661–62 (citations omitted). 
 115. See id. (describing how primary elections are operated by private actors 
even though elections generally are traditional state functions). 
 116. See id. at 660 (“[T]he recognition of the place of the primary in the 
electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix 
the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may 
make the party’s action the action of the State.”); see also id. at 663 (“The party 
takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state 
statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are 
performed by a political party.”). 
 117. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462 (1953). 
 118. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468–70 (1953) (holding that a white 
only “Jaybird primary,” where candidates were pre-selected to run in the official 
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managed a Texas county’s elections independent of the local 
government, and it excluded qualified African-American voters 
from participating in the county’s elections.119 The Jaybird 
Association argued that because it managed elections outside of 
state regulation, its discriminatory acts were not state action and 
could not violate the Fifteenth Amendment.120 The Court 
disagreed, holding that the scheme “produce[d] the equivalent of 
the prohibited election”121 and explained: 
For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes 
is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the 
purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment. The use of the county-
operated primary to ratify the result of the prohibited election 
merely compounds the offense. It violates the Fifteenth 
Amendment for a state, by such circumvention, to permit within 
its borders the use of any device that produces an equivalent of 
the prohibited election.122 
Although the Jaybird Association was not a political party under 
direct state regulation, it effectively took on state functions by 
being the sole manager of Fort Bend County’s elections.123 Thus, 
its actions constituted state action as it performed a function 
traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. 
                                                                                                     
Democratic primary, had become an integral part of Texas’ electoral process and 
therefore violated the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 119. See id. at 465 (discussing the Jaybird Association). The Court stated that: 
The district court found that the Jaybird Association was a political 
organization or party; that the majority of white voters generally abide 
by the results of its primaries and support in the Democratic primaries 
the persons endorsed by the Jaybird primaries; and that the chief 
object of the Association has always been to deny Negroes any voice or 
part in the election of Fort Bend County officials. 
Id. 
 120. See id. at 462–63 (“Jaybirds deny that their racial exclusions violate the 
Fifteenth Amendment. They contend that the Amendment applies only to 
elections or primaries held under state regulation, that their association is not 
regulated by the state at all, and that it is not a political party but a self-governing 
voluntary club.”). 
 121. Id. at 469. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. (“The Jaybird primary has become an integral part, indeed the 
only effective part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and 
govern in the county.”). 
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2. Primary Elections, and a Political Party’s Efforts to Administer 
Them, Are State Action 
The White Primary Cases—and current primary election laws 
and regulations—establish that “primaries may possess all three 
qualifications for state action and certainly would satisfy at least 
one of them.”124 First, primary elections can constitute state action 
“regardless of whether party organizations themselves constitute 
state actors” because the elections are run “by the government to 
serve governmental interests.”125 Second, primary elections can 
constitute state action because even “if the party organization, 
rather than the state, operates the primary, the function it 
performs—namely, the administration of an election—is one 
‘traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.’”126 Third, primary 
elections can constitute state action because “the extensive 
regulatory scheme for primary elections amounts to state 
endorsement, encouragement, and entanglement, and thus, state 
action.”127  
By holding that a party’s primary elections unequivocally 
constitute state action, the Court established that a party 
conducting primaries must “conform to constitutional 
requirements in its treatment” of voters, and the party doing so 
generally lacks the protection of the Bill of Rights against the 
State.128 This characterization of primary elections—and a party’s 
actions to administer primary elections—as state action is a vital 
part of the consideration of the constitutionality of party loyalty 
pledges in open primary elections. After all: party loyalty pledges 
in open primaries are either a constitutional means for parties to 
                                                                                                     
 124. Persily, supra note 58, at 760. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 761. 
 127. Id. at 762. 
 128. Lowenstein, supra note 59, at 1748. Lowenstein further writes: 
[T]he public/private distinction is generally perceived as governing not 
only whether an entity must conform to constitutional requirements in 
its treatment of others, but also whether the entity itself enjoys 
constitutional rights against the government. Thus, by declaring 
parties to be ‘public,’ the White Primary Cases not only prohibited them 
from depriving racial minorities of the right to vote but also seemed to 
deprive the parties of the protections of the Bill of Rights. 
Id. 
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protect its right to association or they are an unconstitutional 
burden on voters’ right to association.129 This conflict will be 
further informed by the next subpart, which surveys the Court’s 
evolutionary and expansive development of the associational 
rights of political parties. 
3. The Evolution and Expansion of the Associational Rights of 
Political Parties 
A political party “has a right to ‘identify the people who 
constitute the association.’”130 A political party’s members have the 
right to “determine for themselves with whom they will associate, 
and whose support they will seek, in their quest for political 
success” because such a determination is “undeniably central to 
the exercise of the right of association.”131 And in no area is the 
political party’s right to exclude more important than in the 
process of selecting its nominee.132 When a party’s members’ 
associational rights conflict with the associational rights of non-
member voters, the Supreme Court has historically sided with the 
interests of the party’s members over the rights of non-member 
voters.133 The Supreme Court has steadily refined and reaffirmed 
this core tenant of First Amendment jurisprudence through 
several landmark cases in the last half-century. 
                                                                                                     
 129. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 653 n.6 (1944) (highlighting that 
the loyalty pledge appears to be a morally rather than a legally enforceable 
pledge).  
 130. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989) 
(quoting Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)). 
 131. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986). 
 132. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (1986) (“That 
process often determines the party’s positions on the most significant public policy 
issues of the day, and even when those positions are predetermined it is the 
nominee who becomes the party’s ambassador to the general electorate in winning 
it over to the party’s views.”). 
 133. See generally Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976) 
(rejecting a claim that Connecticut’s closed-primary system is unconstitutional), 
summarily aff’d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976). 
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a. Nader v. Schaffer: The Constitutionality of Closed Primaries 
In 1976, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the 
Connecticut District Court’s decision in Nader v. Schaffer.134 The 
case featured a group of unregistered voters that refused to 
register as members of a political party but, contrary to the 
provisions of state law, still desired to participate in Connecticut’s 
primary election.135 The group’s complaint against the defendant 
Secretary of State asserted three causes of action, one of which 
notably alleged: 
[C]ompelling them either to enroll in a political party or forego 
a right to vote in a primary election impermissibly forces 
plaintiffs to choose between a right to vote, on the one hand, and 
the right freely to associate for the advancement of political 
ideas, on the other; the latter includes the right to associate 
with a particular candidate regardless of the candidate’s party 
affiliation.136 
The plaintiffs furthered two arguments: first, that “participation 
in a primary election is an exercise of the constitutionally protected 
right to vote and of the constitutionally protected right to associate 
with others in support of a candidate”;137 second, that in addition 
to the right to associate “there is a constitutionally protected 
correlative right not to associate, and to be free from coerced 
associations.”138  
The district court held that “in order to protect party members 
from ‘intrusion by those with adverse political principles,’ and to 
preserve the integrity of the electoral process, a state may 
legitimately condition one’s participation in a party’s nominating 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 850 (D. Conn. 1976) (holding 
that the Connecticut election laws governing the primaries are not in violation of 
the Constitution of the United States, that they provide for legitimate goals 
through constitutionally permissible means, and that there is no need or occasion 
for the judicial relief requested by the plaintiffs). 
 135. See id. at 840 (“Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 9-431 provides in pertinent part: 
‘Eligibility to vote at primary. No person shall be permitted to vote at a primary 
of a party unless he is on the last completed enrolment list of such party in the 
municipality or voting district . . . .’”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 842. 
 138. Id. 
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process on some showing of loyalty to that party . . . .”139 In support 
of this holding, the court affirmed the nature of a political party as 
a “voluntary association, instituted for political purposes, with the 
goal of effectuating the will of its members.”140 Because of a party’s 
nature and purpose, the “constitutionally protected associational 
rights of its members are vitally essential to the candidate 
selection process,”141 deserving “affirmative protection” from the 
courts.142 The court admitted that an “attempt to interfere with a 
party’s ability so to maintain itself is simultaneously an 
interference with the associational rights of its members.”143 In 
this conflict of constitutional rights between party members and 
non-members, the “rights of party members may to some extent 
offset the importance of claimed conflicting rights asserted by 
persons challenging some aspect of the candidate selection 
process.”144 
The plaintiffs argued the statute constituted state action and 
infringed on fundamental liberties, and that the court should apply 
a heightened level of scrutiny of review.145 The Connecticut 
District Court disagreed, ultimately balancing the association 
rights of party members with the association and voting rights of 
non-members: “Not every limitation or incidental burden on the 
exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of 
review.”146 More specifically, a “state statute or policy must cause 
more than a minimal infringement of First Amendment rights 
before a state is called upon to provide a ‘compelling interest’ 
justification.”147 In this case, the court did not identify more than 
minimal infringement, explaining that “enrollment in Connecticut 
imposes absolutely no affirmative party obligations on the voter, 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 847. 
 140. Id. at 844. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 845. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 844 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972)) (“The 
State, plaintiffs assert, may not force them to comply with § 9-431 unless the State 
establishes that it ‘serves a compelling state interest by the least drastic means 
available.’”). 
 146. Id. at 848 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)). 
 147. Id. at 848–49. 
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in terms of time or money, and it does not even obligate him to vote 
for the party’s positions or candidates or to vote at all.”148 This lack 
of “coerced orthodoxy imposed by government officials”149 caused 
the court to side with the party members’ freedom of association to 
exclude unwanted participants from their primary election.150 
Nader represents the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the 
constitutionality of a closed primary—the primary election scheme 
in which only members of a party may legally vote for candidates 
of their respective party.151 In sum, a political party’s associational 
rights permit the categorical exclusion of non-members from 
primary election participation so long as the barriers to and 
obligations of party membership only minimally infringe the 
voter’s freedom of association with the party. 
b. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin: Parties’ Rules Prevail 
Against a State’s Primary Election Scheme 
In 1981, the Supreme Court considered whether the State of 
Wisconsin could insist that its delegates to the Democratic 
National Convention be seated, even though the delegates were 
chosen through an open primary.152 The national Democratic 
Party’s rules, which prescribed that the Democratic National 
Convention delegates be chosen through procedures in which only 
Democrats could participate,153 directly conflicted with Wisconsin’s 
open-primary process, which allowed “non-Democrats—including 
                                                                                                     
 148. Id. at 843. 
 149. Id. at 844. 
 150. See id. (distinguishing a fact from the cases plaintiffs cite to support their 
primary argument, from a fact in the current case, and noting the materiality of 
that fact to present freedom of association inquiry). 
 151. See id. at 850 (finding constitutional the statute that stated voters were 
not eligible to vote in a primary unless the voters were on the last completed 
enrollment list of the party in the municipality or the voting district). 
 152. See Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 109 (1981) (“The 
question on this appeal is whether Wisconsin may successfully insist that its 
delegates to the Convention be seated, even though those delegates are chosen 
through a process that includes a binding state preference primary election in 
which voters do not declare their party affiliation.”). 
 153. See id. (“The Charter of the appellant Democratic Party of the United 
States . . . provides that delegates to its National Convention shall be chosen 
through procedures in which only Democrats can participate.”). 
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members of other parties and independents—to vote in the 
Democratic primary without regard to party affiliation and 
without requiring a public declaration of party preference.”154 The 
national Democratic Party did not challenge Wisconsin’s open-
primary process, conceding the State’s interests for conducting 
open primary elections.155 Rather, the party challenged 
Wisconsin’s requirement that the party be bound by the results of 
the open primary election.156 
The Court clarified the issue on appeal by explaining the 
question presented was not “whether Wisconsin may conduct an 
open primary election if it chooses to do so, or whether the National 
Party may require Wisconsin to limit its primary election to 
publicly declared Democrats.”157 Instead the Court said the 
question was whether “once Wisconsin has opened its Democratic 
Presidential preference primary to voters who do not publicly 
declare their party affiliation, it may then bind the National Party 
to honor the binding primary results, even though those results 
were reached in a manner contrary to National Party rules.”158 
Although the Court readily admitted that “[n]either the right to 
associate nor the right to participate in political activities is 
                                                                                                     
 154. Id. at 110–11. 
 155. See id. at 124–25 (discussing whether the State has compelling interests 
that justify the imposition of its will upon the appellants). The Court writes: 
The State asserts a compelling interest in preserving the overall 
integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot, 
increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing 
harassment of voters. But all those interests go to the conduct of the 
Presidential preference primary—not to the imposition of voting 
requirements upon those who, in a separate process, are eventually 
selected as delegates. 
Id. 
 156. See id. at 121 (discussing whether the State has compelling interests that 
justify the “open” feature of the state primary election law). The Court continues: 
For the rules of the National Party do not challenge the authority of a 
State to conduct an open primary, so long as it is not binding on the 
National Party Convention. The issue is whether the State may compel 
the National Party to seat a delegation chosen in a way that violates 
the rules of the Party. 
Id. 
 157. Id. at 120. 
 158. Id.  
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absolute,”159 the Court explained that this right “necessarily 
presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the 
association, and to limit the association to those people only.”160 
Ultimately, the Court concluded the National Party’s interest to 
preserve its freedom of association was not in conflict with the 
State’s interest “in the manner in which its elections are 
conducted.”161  
The Court held that “a State, or a court, may not 
constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of the Party. 
A political party’s choice among the various ways of determining 
the makeup of a State’s delegation to the party’s national 
convention is protected by the Constitution.”162 Democratic Party 
of United States v. Wisconsin163 does not hold that the 
open-primary process is unconstitutional; to the contrary, it 
reaffirms the State’s interest in conducting open primary elections 
while ruling that the party is not required to be bound by the 
State’s primary results if such a requirement violates the party’s 
rules.164  
c. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut: Parties’ Rules 
Prevail Against a State’s Primary Election Type 
In 1984, the Republican Party of the State of Connecticut 
adopted a rule permitting “independent voters—registered voters 
not affiliated with any political party—to vote in Republican 
primaries for federal and statewide offices.”165 The State’s election 
laws established a closed-primary system, and the 
                                                                                                     
 159. Id. at 124 (citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)). 
 160. Id. at 122. 
 161. Id. at 126. 
 162. Id. at 123–24. 
 163. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 125–26 (1981) 
(holding that the Wisconsin laws unconstitutionally infringed on the Democrats’ 
freedom of association, and Wisconsin did not show a compelling state interest in 
such infringement). 
 164. See id. at 126 (“The National Party rules do not forbid Wisconsin to 
conduct an open primary. But if Wisconsin does open its primary, it cannot 
require that Wisconsin delegates to the National Party Convention vote there in 
accordance with the primary results, if to do so would violate Party rules.”). 
 165. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 210 (1986). 
596 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.563 (2018) 
Democratic-controlled state legislature defeated Republican 
lawmakers’ attempts to amend the state statute to allow for 
independents to vote in primaries when permitted by party 
rules.166 In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,167 the 
Court granted certiorari to consider whether the State’s 
enforcement of the closed-primary law, which contradicted the 
rules of the Republican Party, burdened the Republican Party’s 
right to freedom of association. 
The Court compared the conflicting rights and interests 
between the State of Connecticut and the state Republican 
Party.168 Although the Court conceded the State’s constitutional 
authority to administer elections, it said, “[T]his authority does not 
extinguish the State’s responsibility to observe the limits 
established by the First Amendment rights of the State’s 
citizens.”169 More specifically, the “power to regulate the time, 
place, and manner of elections does not justify, without more, the 
abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote . . . or, 
as here, the freedom of political association.”170 The Court 
continued its tradition of reaffirming the freedom of association 
possessed by partisan political organizations.171 Citing Wisconsin, 
the Court recognized that the freedom of association includes the 
protection of a party’s interest of broadening its base of public 
participation in and support for its activities.172 Applying the strict 
                                                                                                     
 166. See id. at 212–13 (“The proposed legislation was defeated, substantially 
along party lines, in both houses of the legislature, which at that time were 
controlled by the Democratic Party”). 
 167. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986) 
(holding that Connecticut’s closed primary statute interfered with a political 
party’s right to define its associational boundaries). 
 168. See id. at 214–25 (balancing appellees’ interest in freedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas against the state’s interest 
in ensuring the primary system is administrable in preventing raiding, avoiding 
voter confusion, and protecting the responsibility of party government). 
 169. Id. at 217. 
 170. Id. (citation omitted). 
 171. See id. at 214 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)) (“The 
freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
includes partisan political organization.”). 
 172. See id. (explaining freedom of association). The Court explains: 
The Party’s attempt to broaden the base of public participation in and 
support for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the exercise 
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scrutiny standard of review, the Court did not find any of the 
interests proffered by the State to be compelling or the means of 
preserving them—the closed primary—to be narrowly tailored.173  
The Court held “that the State’s enforcement, under these 
circumstances, of its closed-primary system burdens the First 
Amendment rights of the Party. The interests which the appellant 
adduces in support of the statute are insubstantial, and 
accordingly the statute, as applied to the Party in this case, is 
unconstitutional.”174 Tashjian does not represent the Court’s 
repudiation of the closed primary but its disapproval of the State’s 
administration of a more closed primary election despite a state 
party’s preference for a more open primary election. Once again, 
the party’s right to associate prevails against the State’s competing 
interests.175 
d. California Democratic Party v. Jones: The State Cannot Force a 
Party to Associate with Non-Members 
In California Democratic Party v. Jones,176 the Supreme Court 
reviewed California’s Proposition 198, which in 1996 converted 
California’s closed primary to the blanket primary.177 The Court 
reasoned that although the State has a “major role to play in 
structuring and monitoring the election process,” elections are not 
“wholly public affairs that States may regulate freely.”178 In 
contrast to this proposition, Justice Scalia, writing for the 
                                                                                                     
of the right of association. As we have said, the freedom to join together 
in furtherance of common political beliefs “necessarily presupposes the 
freedom to identify the people who constitute the association.” 
Id. 
 173. See id. at 217–25 (reviewing and rejecting each of the State’s compelling 
interests). 
 174. Id. at 225. 
 175. See id. at 229 (“We conclude that § 9–431 impermissibly burdens the 
rights of the Party and its members protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”). 
 176. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 589–90 (2000) (holding 
that California’s blanket primary violated First Amendments rights of the 
political parties). 
 177. See id. at 585–86 (explaining the changes California Proposition 198 
made to the primary system). 
 178. Id. at 572–73. 
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majority, emphasized that in “no area is the political association’s 
right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its 
nominee.”179 The Court referenced its precedent, including 
Tashjian and Wisconsin, and concluded: “California’s blanket 
primary violates the principles set forth in these cases.”180 More 
specifically, the Court said that “Proposition 198 forces political 
parties to associate with—to have their nominees, and hence their 
positions, determined by—those who, at best, have refused to 
affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated 
with a rival.”181 
The Court invalidated California’s blanket primary, holding 
that the State’s proffered interests were not compelling, and, even 
if they were, a blanket primary was not narrowly tailored to 
achieve those interests.182 California Democratic Party v. Jones 
represents the Court’s affirmation of the associational rights of 
political parties, particularly when they come into conflict with a 
state’s election regulations.183 Essentially, a state’s primary 
election scheme cannot force a party to associate with non-
members.184 
                                                                                                     
 179. Id. at 575. 
 180. Id. at 577. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. at 585 (“[W]e do not think that the State’s interest in assuring the 
privacy of this piece of information in all cases can conceivably be considered a 
“compelling” one . . . . [E]ven if all these state interests were compelling ones, 
Proposition 198 is not a narrowly tailored means of furthering them.”). 
 183. See id. at 586 (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 
208, 216 (1986)) (explaining how California hindered party members’ 
constitutional right to select their political party members). The Court states: 
Respondents’ legitimate state interests and petitioners’ First 
Amendment rights are not inherently incompatible. To the extent they 
are in this case, the State of California has made them so by forcing 
political parties to associate with those who do not share their beliefs. 
And it has done this at the “crucial juncture” at which party members 
traditionally find their collective voice and select their spokesman. 
Id. 
 184. See id. (discussing how the California law forced political parties to 
associate with those who do not share their belief). 
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4. The Resolution of the Conflict Between a Party and a Voter’s 
Associational Rights 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Anderson v. Celebrezze185 
and Burdick v. Takushi186 created the Court’s definitive test for 
resolving constitutional challenges to a state’s election laws.187 The 
Court recognized that the fundamental rights of individuals to vote 
in elections and associate with political parties inevitably conflict 
with a state’s legitimate interest in regulating elections.188 But the 
Court also admitted the impossibility applying a “litmus paper 
test” that could automatically resolve every constitutional 
challenge to a state’s election laws.189 So the Court articulated and 
applied “a more flexible standard” that seeks to simultaneously 
affirm the power of states “to regulate their own elections” while 
recognizing that election laws “will invariably impose some burden 
upon individual voters.”190 Under this framework, a court hearing 
claims against a state’s election laws must: 
[F]irst consider the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
                                                                                                     
 185. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (holding that the 
burdens Ohio placed on the “voters’ freedom of choice and freedom of association, 
in an election of nationwide importance, unquestionably outweigh the State’s 
minimal interest in imposing a March deadline”). 
 186. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441–42 (1992) (holding that 
“Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting, considered as part of an electoral scheme 
that provides constitutionally sufficient ballot access, does not impose an 
unconstitutional burden upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the 
State’s voters”). 
 187. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“To evaluate a law respecting the right to vote—whether 
it governs voter qualifications, candidate selection, or the voting process—we use 
the approach set out in Burdick . . . .”). 
 188. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (“Each provision of [the state’s election] 
schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the 
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably 
affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to 
associate with others for political ends.”). 
 189. See id. at 789 (citations omitted) (“Constitutional challenges to specific 
provisions of a State’s election laws therefore cannot be resolved by any 
‘litmuspaper test’ that will separate valid from invalid restrictions. Instead, a 
court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its 
work in ordinary litigation.”). 
 190. Takushi, 504 U.S. at 433–34. 
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Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must 
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the 
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In 
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the 
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must 
consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary 
to burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these 
factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the 
challenged provision is unconstitutional.191  
The Anderson/Burdick balancing test functions as a standard of 
review from which the Court may apply varying levels of scrutiny 
depending on the burden imposed by an election regulation and 
the interests allegedly pursued by the State.192 When First or 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters are burdened by severe 
restrictions, the Court applies a heightened standard of review 
resembling strict scrutiny, which requires the challenged 
regulation to be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
compelling importance.”193 In contrast, when a state’s election law 
“imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters,” the Court 
applies a form of rational basis review, which means “‘the State’s 
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ 
these restrictions.”194  
The Supreme Court has applied the Anderson/Burdick 
analysis in resolving myriad election law disputes, including, but 
not limited to, striking down filing deadlines for independent 
candidates195 and a closed-primary system contrary to the rules of 
                                                                                                     
 191. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 192. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“Under this standard, 
the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends 
upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.”). 
 193. See id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
 194. See id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
 195. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 805–06 (using the first formulation of the 
Anderson/Burdick test to “conclude that Ohio’s March filing deadline for 
independent candidates for the office of President of the United States cannot be 
justified by the State’s asserted interest in protecting political stability”).  
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a political party,196 while upholding write-in vote bans,197 fusion 
candidates prohibitions,198 and voter photo identification 
requirements.199 Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider 
a constitutional challenge to a state’s law permitting party loyalty 
pledges in an open primary, lower courts have applied the 
Anderson/Burdick balancing test in upholding these types of 
pledges as constitutional.200 
This Note argues that, although the Anderson/Burdick test is 
the appropriate means by which to evaluate the constitutionality 
of a party loyalty pledge in an open primary election, lower 
courts—notably the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia in Parson—have misapplied the Anderson/Burdick test in 
finding these party loyalty pledges to be constitutional. This Note 
argues that an application of the test in accordance with the 
analysis modeled by and standards established in Anderson would 
likely—and ought to—render the opposite result. 
                                                                                                     
 196. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986) 
(using the Anderson test to “conclude that the State’s enforcement . . . of its closed 
primary system burdens the First Amendment rights of the Party. The interests 
which the appellant adduces in support of the statute are insubstantial, and 
accordingly the statute . . . is unconstitutional”). 
 197. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441 (applying the Anderson/Burdick test to 
“conclude that when a State’s ballot access laws pass constitutional muster as 
imposing only reasonable burdens on First and Fourth Amendment rights—as do 
Hawaii’s election laws—a prohibition on write-in voting will be presumptively 
valid . . . .”). 
 198. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 354 (1997) 
(exercising the Anderson/Burdick test to evaluate Minnesota’s law prohibiting a 
candidate from appearing on the ballot for more than one party and concluding 
that “such a prohibition does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution”). 
 199. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) 
(employing the Anderson/Burdick test to conclude that the “state interests 
identified as justifications for [Indiana’s voter photo identification law] are both 
neutral and sufficiently strong to require us to reject petitioners’ facial attack on 
the statute”). 
 200. See generally Jones v. Alabama, No. 00-0442, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3909 
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2001) (dismissing plaintiff’s equal protection clause claim 
because plaintiff did not show that there was a fundamental right to vote in a 
primary encompassed in the fundamental right to vote in an election); see 
generally Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479 (E.D. Va. 2016) (denying 
plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction for a Virginia primary). 
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IV. Argument 
A. Independent Voters in Open Primaries Are a Protected Class of 
Voters 
In Parson, the Eastern District of Virginia invoked the 
Anderson/Burdick framework to analyze the plaintiffs’ First and 
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to Virginia’s statutory 
provision allowing parties to use loyalty pledges in the 
Commonwealth’s open primary elections, saying the test “applies 
to all of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.”201 The court divided its 
analysis into three parts: First, the burden on the plaintiffs; 
second, the State’s interests; third, the balancing of the two 
aforementioned elements.202 
However, within the Anderson/Burdick framework, it is 
imperative for a court to first identify who is burdened by a state’s 
regulations before considering the nature of the burdens 
imposed.203 The Supreme Court in Anderson began its analysis by 
identifying the class of voters whose fundamental rights were 
burdened by the State’s election regulations;204 in that case, it was 
“an identifiable segment of Ohio’s independent-minded voters.”205 
In Parson, the District Court inferred that the plaintiffs’ alleged 
an equal protection claim on behalf of African-American voters but 
discounted the claim as unsubstantiated at worst or merely proof 
of an unintended discriminatory impact at best.206 What the 
plaintiffs in Anderson succeeded in demonstrating—and what the 
plaintiffs in Parson failed to argue—is the existence of another 
                                                                                                     
 201. Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 492 n.20. 
 202. Id. at 493–97. 
 203. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (“It must first 
consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate.  It then must identify and evaluate the precise interest [of] the State 
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”).  
 204. See id. at 792 (discussing the burden the March filing deadline has on 
independents who decide to run after the deadline, independents who decide to 
run before the deadline, and independent voters). 
 205. Id.  
 206. See Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 491 n.19 (E.D. Va. 2016) 
(“Notwithstanding the speculative nature of this claim, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that proof of a discriminatory impact is not sufficient by itself to 
prove an equal protection violation.”). 
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identifiable class of voters possessing the fundamental rights to 
vote and associate: “independent-minded voters.”207 Although 
unidentified and unconsidered in Parson, this segment of voters is 
particularly and unreasonably targeted by party loyalty pledges in 
open primary elections, which are in fact designed to accommodate 
the freedom of association of independent and unregistered 
voters.208 
B. Party Loyalty Pledges in Open Primaries Burden Independent 
Voters’ Fundamental Liberties 
In accordance with the Anderson/Burdick framework, the 
Parson court first considered “the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments” that the plaintiffs sought to vindicate.209 The court 
correctly identified the right to vote and the freedom to associate 
as fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.210 The court gave essentially two reasons why the 
plaintiffs’ fundamental liberties were not severely burdened: First, 
the court indicated that the voter’s right to vote and associate with 
a political party in a primary election may not be as fundamental 
or absolute as voting for or associating with a political party in a 
general election;211 second, the court categorized the plaintiffs’ 
three alleged burdens as speculative.212  
                                                                                                     
 207. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790. 
 208. See id. (discussing the First Amendment rights of independent voters). 
 209. Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 493 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 
780, 789 (1983)). 
 210. See id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)) (“A voter’s right 
to vote ‘is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.’”); see also id. 
(quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)) (“The right to associate with 
the political party of one’s choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional 
freedom [of the freedom to associate].”). 
 211. See id. at 493 n.22 (“That said, the Supreme Court seems to question 
whether the right to vote in a primary is as fundamental as exercising that right 
in a general election.”); see also id. at 493 (“The Supreme Court has neither 
articulated, nor repudiated, a voter’s right not to associate with a political party.  
However the Supreme Court has expressed that voters’ rights not to associate 
with a party cannot trump, or even equal, a political party’s right not to associate 
with some voters . . . .”). 
 212. See id. at 494–95 (indicating that the lack of sufficient evidence to prove 
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The court concluded the latter for two primary reasons: First, 
the court viewed the claims as speculative due to the plaintiffs’ 
failure to demonstrate substantial evidence in support of their 
claims;213 second, the court deemed the Republican Party’s loyalty 
pledge to be legally unenforceable, citing Ray v. Blair214 and Jones 
v. Alabama,215 and explaining that a “private, unenforceable 
pledge does not pose a severe burden.”216 The court admitted that 
the plaintiffs’ claims of burden did not necessarily fail, but that 
they lacked support particularly needed in a motion for 
preliminary injunction.217 The court’s conclusions of the sufficiency 
of the evidence and efficacy of the pledge are likely accurate 
considering this particular case’s claims and facts. But the 
plaintiffs failed to argue, and the court neglected to analyze, a 
severe burden present in this case and originally articulated in 
Anderson on behalf its “identifiable segment of Ohio’s 
independent-minded voters.”218 It is a burden that, if identified, 
would likely invalidate party loyalty pledges imposed in open 
primary elections. 
In Anderson, the Court affirmed that the rights at issue in that 
case, and eventually at issue in Parson—the “right of individuals 
to associate for the advancement of political beliefs” and “the right 
of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast 
their votes effectively”—are “among our most precious 
freedoms.”219 Like the court in Parson, the Anderson court 
                                                                                                     
the plaintiffs’ contentions makes the claims speculative in nature). 
 213. See id. (responding to each of the plaintiffs’ three contentions as lacking 
sufficient evidence to constitute proof of severe burdens). 
 214. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952) (holding that “the Twelfth 
Amendment does not bar a political party form requiring the pledge to support 
the nominees of the National Convention”).   
 215. See Jones v. Alabama, No. 00-0442-RV-L , 2001 WL 303533, at *2–6 (S.D. 
Ala. Mar. 7, 2001) (holding that the Alabama Democratic Party’s party loyalty 
pledge did not implicate fundamental rights and was substantially related to the 
important state goal of reducing “raiding,” defined as when “those antipathetic to 
a party nonetheless vote in its primary” in order to nominate a more vulnerable 
general election candidate). 
 216. Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 494 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 217. See id. at 495 (“Although Plaintiffs’ additional claims of burden do not 
necessarily fail, they lack support at this stage of the proceedings.”). 
 218. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792 (1983). 
 219. Id. at 787 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968)). 
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acknowledged that although “these rights of voters are 
fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by States” also “impose 
constitutionally suspect burdens on voters’ rights to associate or to 
choose among candidates.”220 Justifying the balancing test that 
would eventually bear its name, the Anderson court admitted that 
each provision of a state’s election code “inevitably affects—at least 
to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to 
associate with others for political ends.”221 Despite this concession, 
the court identified the fundamental right of “political 
participation by an identifiable political group whose members 
share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic 
status.”222 Although the court was speaking of a different issue—
candidates’ ballot access—party loyalty pledges have the same 
effect on independent or unregistered voters in open primary 
elections—they deny “the ‘disaffected’ not only a choice of 
leadership but a choice on the issues as well.”223 
The Parson court found the burdens imposed by the 
Republican Party of Virginia’s loyalty pledge on the plaintiffs’ 
associational and voting rights to be “neutral and reasonable.”224 
Contrary to the Parson court’s conclusion, the Anderson court’s 
reasoning justifies the conclusion that the burden imposed on 
independent or unregistered voters’ fundamental liberties by party 
loyalty pledges in open primaries is severe.225 To borrow the 
language of Anderson: party loyalty pledges in open primary 
elections inherently “operate as a mechanism to exclude certain 
classes of candidates from the electoral process”226 by forbidding 
independent or unregistered voters to participate in a party’s 
primary unless they effectively register as a member of that party 
                                                                                                     
 220. Id. at 788. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 793. 
 223. Id. at 792 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968)). 
 224. Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 497 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 225. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793–94 (1983) (“A burden that 
falls unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates 
impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the First 
Amendment. It discriminates against those candidates and—of particular 
importance—against those voters whose political preferences lie outside the 
existing political parties.”). 
 226. Id. at 793. 
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by signing the pledge. A party loyalty pledge is a minimal burden, 
if a burden at all, to a voter in a closed-primary system or to a voter 
that already identifies as or is a registered member of the party in 
an open-primary system. To borrow Anderson’s language again: A 
party loyalty pledge “unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the 
‘availability of political opportunity’”227 of independent or 
unregistered voters in open-primary systems.228  
This type of restriction is far from those that are “generally 
applicable and evenhanded” that are upheld by the Court.229 
Similar to the filing deadline provision at issue in Anderson, party 
loyalty pledges in open primaries limit the opportunities of 
“independent-minded voters to associate in the electoral arena to 
enhance their political effectiveness as a group.”230 If that burden 
was not severe enough alone, its effect is to “reduce diversity and 
competition in the marketplace of ideas,”231 which nullifies the 
very purpose of primary elections. 
C. Party Loyalty Pledges in Open Primaries Do Not Withstand 
Strict Scrutiny 
Because party loyalty pledges in open primaries are class-
based—placing severe burdens on independent and unregistered 
voters—it is necessary for parties wishing to impose such pledges 
to satisfy strict scrutiny to pass the Anderson/Burdick test.232 The 
Parson court found the Republican Party of Virginia’s party loyalty 
pledge only be a “reasonable, nondiscriminatory” restriction “upon 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters,” warranting 
intermediate scrutiny, which allows for the State’s “important 
regulatory interests” to be “generally sufficient to justify the 
                                                                                                     
 227. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 (quoting Clemens v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 
964 (1982) (plurality opinion)). 
 228. See id. (highlighting that the burden falls unequally on new or small 
political parties or on independent candidates). 
 229. Id. at 788 n.9. 
 230. Id. at 794. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. at 805–06 (using the first formulation of the Anderson/Burdick 
test to “conclude that Ohio’s March filing deadline for independent candidates for 
the office of President of the United States cannot be justified by the State’s 
asserted interest in protecting political stability”). 
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restrictions.”233 However, as the Anderson comparison requires, 
when “the plaintiffs’ rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the 
regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
compelling importance.”234 Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether 
(1) the state has a compelling interest in permitting or prescribing 
party loyalty pledges in open primary elections; and, even if so, 
whether (2) that regulation is narrowly drawn.235 
The state has no compelling interest for the enforcement of 
party loyalty pledges in open primary elections. The Parson court 
itself identified two interests offered by the Commonwealth of 
Virginia in defense of the party loyalty pledge: “[F]irst, the 
Commonwealth’s protection of the [Republican Party of Virginia]’s 
own constitutional rights, and second, the state’s interest in the 
order and integrity of the electoral process.”236 Under an 
intermediate scrutiny standard, the court found that these two 
interests were important regulatory interests sufficient to justify 
the party loyalty pledge within the open-primary scheme.237  
But in accordance with the strict scrutiny standard extracted 
from the Anderson analysis,238 even if these two interests were 
compelling the enforcement of a party loyalty pledge in an 
open-primary system is not a means sufficiently narrowly tailored 
to further those interests. If the Republican Party of Virginia 
wants to ensure that only true Republicans will participate in its 
open primary, the most narrowly tailored approach the 
Commonwealth of Virginia can take is to pursue a closed 
primary—in which only registered voters may vote for their 
parties—or a semi-closed primary—in which independents and 
                                                                                                     
 233. Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 492 (E.D. Va. 2016) (quoting 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). 
 234. Id. (quoting Sarvis v. Judd, 80 F. Supp. 3d 692, 698 (E.D. Va. 2015)). 
 235. See generally Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 236. Id. at 496. 
 237. See id. at 492 (quoting Sarvis v. Judd, 80 F. Supp. 3d 692, 698 (E.D. Va. 
2015)) (“[W]hen a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of voters, the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 
justify the restrictions.”). 
 238.  See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792–93 (“As our cases have held, it is 
especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that limits political 
participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a particular 
viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.”). 
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unregistered voters may participate in the primary of the party of 
their choice.239 The Supreme Court in Nader v. Schaffer already 
upheld this closed-primary approach as constitutional, as explored 
above.240  
Until the Republican Party of Virginia pushes for reform of the 
Commonwealth’s primary election scheme, it cannot have it both 
ways: attempting to mitigate the risks of an open primary by 
enforcing a party loyalty pledge— and reaping all the rewards of 
an open primary—at the cost of the associational rights of 
independent voters. This practice does nothing more than 
disenfranchise an entire segment of the voting population that is 
not required by the Commonwealth to register by party in order to 
vote in its presidential primary. 
V. Conclusion 
The Eastern District of Virginia incorrectly applied 
Anderson/Burdick framework to decide Parson. A clearer reading 
and application of the Anderson/Burdick test in Parson would 
likely lead to the opposite result. Fundamentally, the court failed 
to identify the class of independent voters in Virginia’s 
open-primary system. These voters’ associational rights were 
impermissibly burdened by Virginia’s statutory scheme and the 
state Republican Party’s use of a party loyalty pledge, which 
constituted state action subject to constitutional review.  
The theory and case law indicate that party loyalty pledges in 
open primaries constitute state action that impermissibly burdens 
a protected class of independent voters’ freedom of association. 
These pledges are not narrowly tailored means to further any of 
the State’s compelling interests, particularly when applied in 
primary election schemes that promote voters’ independence. And 
every effort by parties or states to limit the associational rights of 
independent voters in open primary elections should be deemed 
unconstitutional. If a class of independent voters is more clearly 
                                                                                                     
 239. See id. (discussing how placing unequal burdens on small or independent 
political classes impinges on the First Amendment protections of the freedom to 
associate). 
 240. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 850 (D. Conn. 1976), summarily 
aff’d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976). 
I PLEDGE ALLEGIANCE TO THE PARTY 609 
and readily identified in open-primary states that allow—or have 
parties that mandate—party loyalty pledges, future cases and 
controversies on the conflict of associational rights between parties 
and independent voters may lead to that very result. 
It is time to reclaim the First Amendment associational rights 
of independent voters in open-primary states. Independent voters 
in open-primary states do not owe allegiance to any political party. 
They ought not be required to pledge it. 
